Cahn: The Moral Decision by Jentes, William R., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 2 
1955 
Cahn: The Moral Decision 
William R. Jentes S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William R. Jentes S.Ed., Cahn: The Moral Decision, 54 MICH. L. REV. 301 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/18 
 
This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1955 ] RECENT BOOKS 301
THE MORAL DECISION. By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press. 1955. Pp. ix, 842. $5.
Seeking to uncover a previously untouched source of moral knowledge,
Professor Cahn turns to "the supply of moral insight and experience that
American courts have gradually developed and accumulated."' The
method he adopts to work this mine is not unlike the case method em-
ployed by the majority of American law schools. A digest of an actual
case is presented which serves to dramatize and illustrate a moral problem.
This problem is then discussed in the light of the court's solution and is
amplified through analogous cases and logical analysis. Ranging over a
broad field Professor Cahn treats a score of major moral problems which
confront the courts. This method of developing his thesis is indeed
stimulating, but the reader finds that the solutions which the law reaches
are more often criticized by Professor Cahn than not. He admits the fail-
ings which he himself discovers in the legal decisions, but seeks to excuse
them by pointing to the fact that the cases are designed to focus on the
problems and not necessarily to provide illustrations of correct moral
decisions. In the light of the book's stated purpose-to reveal the rich
repository of moral knowledge in the law-this admission is disappointing.
The project which Professor Cahn outlines for himself fails of complete
accomplishment because of deficiencies in the assumptions upon which he
bases his analysis. He is correct in assuming that the law can provide
moral guides, but he fails to recognize the full implications of this fact in
two respects. While we can study the law's moral decisions in an attempt
to find a guide for our own, the law's important educative effects do not
result from such conscious efforts on our part.2 Its primary influence on
moral precepts is more subtle. The law prescribes required standards of
conduct and these standards are generally followed without any conscious
recognition by the community of their moral significance. Yet these
prescribed patterns of conduct are eventually accepted as morally "right"
largely because the community becomes accustomed to follow them. Pro-
fessor Cahn also underestimates the importance of the functional inter-
relationship between these moral and legal standards. Law is teleological;
it is a device for "social engineering"8 which is guided in part by the com-
munity. As a result, the moral guides which Professor Cahn seeks to derive
from the law may not be results independently arrived at by the courts,
but only the moral precepts of the community reworked by the legal ma-
chinery.4
Professor Cahn argues that the legal system offers an illustration of a
proper method for treating moral questions. He points to the law's stress
I CAHN, THE MORAL DEcisioN 3 (1955).
2 COHEN, M., RYASON AND LAW 164 (1950); PETRAzYcI, LAw AND MORALrry, VOl. VII
of 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, 93-100 (1955).
3 POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, rev. ed., 47 (1954).
4 CARozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICiAL PROCESS, Lecture III (1921).
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on what is improper, rather than proper, conduct. He finds its method
adaptable to the individual's psychologic "constitution." He applauds the
concreteness, preciseness, decisiveness, and responsibility which are devel-
oped by its procedures. The difficulty with his analysis is that he assumes
that these are qualities peculiar to the legal method. In reality he is only
abstracting the logical foundations of the legal thought process, the induc-
tive and deductive bases underlying any sound attempt at reasoning.5 Of
course there is nothing wrong in drawing an analogy between the system
of thought as developed in the law and one which might be employed in
the field of morals, providing the proper limitations on the analogy are
maintained. There is a danger, however, that distinctions will be forgotten
and ideas suited to only one area will be applied in another. It was for this
reason that Holmes felt it would probably be "a gain if every word of moral
significance could be banished from the law .... -B Equal confusion con-
fronts the moralist who uncritically accepts legal methods and ideas. Even
if Professor Cahn chooses to ignore the fact that the law has no monopoly
on sound thinking and that there are dangers inherent in analogizing law
to morals, he should at least extend his inquiry to include the legislative
as well as judicial process. Implicitly accepting, as he does, the "realists"'
definition of law as "a decision of a court" 7 the importance of legislation
in determining that decision still demands some study of the procedures
employed to ascertain the moral standards which are supplied to the bench.
The most significant defect in Professor Cahn's analysis, however, is his
assumption that the legal precepts he employs as illustrations of moral
decisions somehow attain their moral significance without reference to
norms external to the legal system.s A legal decision is not "right" merely
because it has been reached in accordance with the law's procedures; the
courts are not dealing in syllogisms. Even assuming that the result would
be morally correct if a product of a properly functioning legal machinery,
the product would be deficient in most cases due to the defects in the
machinery itself. Professor Cahn would be the first to admit these facts.9
Unfortunately, except for his own predilections as to the correct legal solu-
tions of the moral problems presented, he offers no hint of what external
norms should be employed.' 0 In the light of the fact that Professor Cahn
really does not state why one legal solution is better than another it is
difficult to see how the law will offer any great assistance to the moralist by
way of illustrating proper modes of conduct.
William R. Jentes, S.Ed.
5 RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, CC. VI-VIII (1936).
6 HOLMES, CoLLEcrzD LEGAL PAPERS 179 (1920).
7 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 46 (1930).
S COHEN, F., ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 40-42 (1933).
9 CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION 245, 246 (1955).
30 Compare STAMMLER, THE THEORY OF JusTIcE, Modern Legal Philosophy Series, 112
et seq. (1925).
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